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Designing Asia - Pacific Economic Cooperation
Chien-peng Chung*
1. Introduction
This is an account of competing visions or designs of trans-Pacific economic
cooperation , and a口empts to uni 秒， or retain , the differences that have evolved ,
in the structure and objectives of the multilateral Asia - Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum. The means and goals of regulating and
advancing trans-Pacific economic cooperation is important for us to care
about because , if nothing else , the volume and value of commerce and
investment across this macro-region is about that of a11 others in the wo r1 d
combined.
Since APEC was formed in 1989 with twelve founding countries gathering for
its first meeting of foreign ministers on economic matters , l eighteen years
have passed , which should provide enough time to evaluate its merits ,
limitations and prospects. Unfortunately, while a child bom eighteen years
ago can by now be considered an adult, if APEC were human , this body of
presently twenty-one members seems to be still crawling all over the floor.
Countries coming together to craft a trans-national forum implies a joint
search for some common purpose. However, so doing also means that the
medium would reflect the con f1 uence or divergence of the national interests
and underlying values of the constituent members , particularly that of the
larger economies , as defined by their goveming elites. As the mode of
operation of any organization is important in setting its priorities or
channeling its purposes , the tussle or harmonization of values and underlying
interests among members has surfaced in designing or envisioning alternative
futures for APEC.
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The twelve founding members that formed APEC on 6-7 November 1989 were Australia,
Brunei Darussalam, Canada, lndonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines,
Singapore , Thailand and the United States. Economies that subsequently joined the forum were
the People 's Republic of China, Hong Kong and Chinese Taipei (Taiwan) on 12-14 November
1991 , Mexico and Papua New Guinea on 17-19 November 1993, Chile on 11-12 November 1994,
and Peru , Russia and Vietnam on 14-15 November 1998
I

For the United States , APEC's utility depended on its ability to accelerate the
process of trade liberalization within the grouping, particularly in improving
US access to East Asian markets in areas where the US is competitive, such as
aircra缸， telecommunications and banking and insurance , and to strengthen
America's hands in trade negotiations with the European Union. A major
consideration of both Japan and Australia in helping to bring about APEC was
their attempt to thwart protectionist impulses on the part of the Europeans and
Americans , through directing the development of an open or
non-discriminatory trans-Pacific trade liberalizing economic arrangement.
With the acquiescence of the US , Japan had also hoped APEC would play to
its strength as a major economic power and provide a stage for it to claim a
leadership role in the Asian half of the forum through its trade with ,
investment in , technological transfers to , and financial institutions operating
in other Asian countries.
China's vision for APEC was that of a consultative forum where decisions
should be made gradually and through consensus , and economic and technical
cooperation should be carried out on an equal footing with the reduction of
trade barriers (Camilleri 2003 , 161). In particular, China had hoped that
APEC could assuage US unilateralism in trade relations , enhance its prospects
of gaining admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO) , and
legitimize its expanding influence in the Asia-Pacific region (Camilleri 2003 ,
161). As for the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) , while fully cognizant of APEC's usefulness in keeping the US
market open in the face of increasing American protectionist sentiments , they
were worried that joining APEC would mean diluting the salient position of
ASEAN as a bloc in managing Southeast Asian affairs for themselves. As
such , at a ministerial conference at Kuching, Malaysia, in 1990 , the ASEAN
countries came to a consensus that participation in APEC must not come at
the expense of ASEAN unity and cohesion , that APEC should not evolve
from a forum for discussion into an arena for economic bargaining or
negotiation , and that APEC should not be transformed into a formal ,
structured institution (Lu 1997a, 103).
As APEC evolved , an “ evolutionary approach" generally favored by the Asian ,
Chinese and developing member govemments or economies loosely
organized around a forum where commitments are voluntary with emphasis
on arriving at consensus unhurriedly through personal diplomacy and
informal discussions has come to dominate the modus operandi of the forum;
this has often been contrasted with a “ legalistic and institutional approach"
championed by the United States , and supported by Canada, Australia and
2

New Zealand , which was to focus on building APEC up as a formal and
structured organization where theprimary function of structured negotiations
is to produce binding contracts and agreements (Camilleri 2003 , 144; Liu
1997 , 81). 1n the former case , the appeal and stress is on the contribution to
national development and domestic security through technical and economic
cooperation - the subsumption of markets to the political logic of security and
order (Beeson and Jayasuriya 1998 , 316) , while in the latter case , the
construction of a trans-Pacific market is conceived primarily in terms of
maximizing individual choice by locking in the liberalization of trade and
associated economic processes through binding , comprehensive targets.
Although there is basic agreement among APEC member economies on the
principles of economic cooperation and trade and investment liberalization,
when concrete issues arise which involve national interest , consensus on any
matter is typically hard to achieve , and the differences in approach adopted by
countries favoring either one of the two m司 or styles of economic regionalism
are revealed. This division in the fundamental outlook for the forum has led to
differences over how best to reach APEC's goals of trade liberalization, the
extent to which APEC should be institutionalized, and the items to be put on
the agenda of the annual meetings , differences that are at times so deep that
the effective functioning of the forum itself gets questioned. As we shall see ,
these differences in approach , because they are bifurcated into , and supported
by, two broad groups of countries on either side of the division , have the
effect of moving the forum from one dominant design to another as member
economies both create and respond to changing circumstances , with both
designs overlapping during the shift as a result of compromises made.

“

1I.0ne Western / American / Structural" Design (1989-1993)

Australia's Prime Minister Bob Hawke originally proposed a regional
economic grouping to support trade liberalization and encourage coordination
of economic policy with membership restricted to ASEAN , Australia, New
Zealand, Japan and South Korea; however, Australia's suggestion to exclude
the US and Canada caused misgivings from Japan , and 1ndonesia emphasized
the role of the US in balancing Japanese economic dominance (Walsh 1993 ,
548-9). After canvassing several East Asian govemments and the US , Hawke
revised his proposal to include the US and Canada , recognizing them as major
forces driving the Asia - Pacific economy (Walsh 1993 , 549).
The earliest “ Western / American / Structured" (shortened to “ Westem")
vision or design for APEC was what the US , major Westem countries like

Australia , New Zealand and Canada , and Japan had in mind as far back as the
occasion of its inaugural meeting , then only at the level of ministers
concerned with foreign and economic matters , in Canberra, Australia , in
November 1989. Such a design would have accorded well with the structured
and bureaucratized representative democratic systems of governance that
policy makers in these countries embrace. At the APEC ministerial meeting in
Seoul , South Korea, in November 1991 , an APEC secretariat was proposed
for establishment in Singapore the following year. At APEC's Fourth
扎1inisterial 此1eeting in 1992 in Singapore , Japan and Thailand suggested
bringing security issues into the forum (Liang and Wang 2000 , 57) , but when
faced with less than enthusiastic response from other Asian countries , decided
to drop the matter. The US was initially not too enthusiastic about APEC , and
still trying to figure out its exact purpose , until an expert body of economic
advisors , known as the Eminent Persons' Group , was constituted by the forum
at its 1992 meeting, and soon took on the task of advocating across-the-board
trade liberalization, which greatly raised Washington's interest in the
groupmg.
The high point of the “ Western" design was reached at the first APEC
Heads-of-State Meeting or Leaders' Summit at Blake Island off Seattle in the
US in November 1993 , when the host, US President Bill Clinton , suggested
renaming and structuralizing the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation as the
Asia-Pacific Economic Community, along the lines of the European
Economic Community, precursor of the European Union. In a talk at Japan's
Waseda University earlier that July and on a subsequent visit to South Korea,
President Clinton pointed out that US strategic policy in the Asia-Pacific
region would henceforth be based on three elements: 1) Comprehensive US
involvement in Asia-Pacific economic cooperation, 2) Realization of an
Asia-Pacific multilateral security mechanism under US leadership , and 3)
Promoting democratization in Asia-Pacific countries (Wang 2003 ，的 7; Liang
and Wang 2000 , 57). The US President also had plans to combine the existing
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the putative Free Trade Area
of the Americas (FTAA) with APEC into a gigantic Asia-Pacific Free Trade
Area (APFTA) (Wei 1996, 55). The American vision for APEC was clearly
not just for the forum to push for a structured Asia-Pacific-wide free trade
area, but also for the body to turn into a multilateral security arrangement
under the direction of the US , and realize its political objective of spreading
pluralism.
As primarily an economic forum , trade liberalization , in the “ Western" vision ,
was to be APEC's principal objective ，的 it was that of the US , which

organized , led and dominated the Seattle Meeting. At least until 1995 , the US
economic policy stance on APEC could be summarized as follows 1)
Transform APEC as soon as possible into an Asia-Pacific free trade area
through negotiations and agreements , 2) Liberalize trade in all economic
sectors to avoid delay and allowing member economies to make strategic
choices of “ pick and choose ," 3) Adopt the principle of discrimination
between member and non-member economies to avoid non-member
economies “ free riding" on APEC's trade liberalization efforts , and 4) Push
for a structured forum with legally binding commitments through collective
agreement (Liu 1997, 83; Wang 2003 , 141). As outlined in 1992 by the
Australian government, which has been a prime mover of APEC's early
development, there were four steps for APEC to take to advance its trade
liberalization objectives: reduce uncertainties in the regional market, address
physical impediments to trade, harmonize national regulations and standards,
and improve market access (Camilleri 2003 , 147-148).
Free trade became , especially for the English-speaking industrialized
economies, the dominant discourse of which they were more than prepared to
push onto APEC's agenda to the extent of marginalizing any other views or
interests. They saw traditional business practices elsewhere , particularly in the
East and Southeast Asian countries , as manifesting widespread collusion ,
between firms , across industries , and among the political and economic elites ,
based on patronage and close personal ties , and these entrenched customs and
domestic interest networks were what they wished to sweep away with the
promotion and institutionalization of trade liberalization within APEC.
Debates over free trade , and the attendant principle of discrimination , would
become the major bones of contention between the US and industrialized
Western economies on the one hand , and China and the developing Asian
economies on the other, and subsequently the rock on which the utility of
APEC as a meaningful economic grouping would crash.
China was obviously too large an Asian-Pacific economy to be left out of the
forum, but its membership has proven to be problematic right from the
beginning. The US has argued that, since China was not a market economy, it
should not be allowed to join APEC. However, since the People's Republic of
China cI aims Taiwan as part of its territory and was about to “ resume"
sovereignty over Hong Kong from Britain, diplomatic realities dictated that
the exclusion of China would also mean the ex cI usion of the vibrant market
economies of Hong Kong and Taiwan. This quandary was resolved when ，的
the 1991 Seoul ministerial meeting approached , Taiwan agreed to attend
APEC meetings as “ Chinese Taipei" , together with China and Hong Kong ,

(Walsh 1993 , 551 , 554). China accepted this arrangement reluctantly，的 long
as all APEC members were designated as “ economies" and not “ states ,"
which reflected its diplomatic weakness and isolation in the wake of the June
1989 Tiananmen Incident and its concern not to be left out of an emerging
inter-govemmental regional economic process , particularly since about 75%
of China's trade and 80 0/0 of its foreign capital in the early 1990s involved
other APEC members (Morrison 2002 , 127-128). However, although other
APEC governments have agreed that China would have an effective veto over
who would represent Taiwan at the leaders' and other meetings, Beijing
would never again consent to Taipei taking part in any multilateral or regional
design in which government officials are the participants.
The major institutional advancements for APEC took place between the 1992
ministerial meeting in Singapore and 1994 leaders' meeting in Bogor,
Indonesia. A small secretariat with a very limited budget , autonomy and
research capability was established at the Singapore meeting to facilitate and
coordinate APEC activities. The APEC Secretariat is led by an Executive
Director seconded from the member economy which is the annual host of the
APEC process , and usual1y aided by one official each seconded from the
foreign affairs or trade ministries of member economies for two to three years ,
and a proximate number of locally recruited administrative support staff
(Goodings 2003 , 68). Aside from the Secretariat, an Eminent Persons ' Group
(EPG) was also established at the 1992 meeting, the majority of whose
members were economists under the chairmanship of American economist C.
Fred Bergsten, and saw the task of the EPG as devising a roadmap for APEC
to set itself on the path of trade , investment and later even financial
liberalization.
It was at the Seattle Leaders' Meeting in 1993 that arrangements were made
for the two arguably most important APEC standing policy committees, the
Committee on Trade and Investment (CTI) and the Budget and Management
Committee (BMC) to be established in 1994 and meet twice a year. The
Economic Committee , established at the 4 th APEC Ministerial Meeting in
1994, has a mandate to promote structural , regulatory and legal reform in
member economies , but this committee has been extremely hesitant , and one
may even say, almost powerless , to drive any changes within the forum ,
except by organizing seminars and workshops on strengthening economic and
legal
infrastructure
(http://www.apec.org/contentlapec/apec_groups/
committees/economic_ committee.html). By 1994, institutionally, there were
in place fi ve levels of organizational activities , from top to bottom: APEC
Informal Leaders' Meeting, Ministerial Meeting , Sectoral Ministerial Meeting,
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Senior Officers' Meeting (SOM) , and committee or working group , plus the
Secretariat. Typically, the APEC Informal Leaders' Meeting takes place at the
second half of every year, coinciding with concurrent meetings of foreign
ministers , ministers of economics and trade , and business leaders. These
ministerial meetings , which approve the budget and set policy directions for
the forum in the following year, build on the ministerial meetings of economic
sectors held occasionally throughout the year, all of which are supported by
the SOMs , which are held four times a year, and serve as a coordinating body
for the committees and working groups (Bodde 1994, 67)
111. Two Competing Designs: “ Western / American / Structured" vs.
“ Asian / Chinese / Process-oriented" (1994-1995)
As a regional trade grouping , APEC had a competitor almost right from its
birth. Worries about emerging trade blocs and protectionism in Europe and
North America led Malaysia in December 1990 to propose an East Asian
Economic Group (EAEG) that excluded the US, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand. US officials opposed the proposal , and under pressure from
Washington, Tokyo was non-committal about the proposal (Walsh 1993, 555).
As decided at the ASEAN finance ministers' meeting in October 1991 , EAEG
was renamed EAEC, grouping the ASEAN states with China, Japan and
South Korea into an “ East Asian Economic Caucus" and after consideration
by the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting in July 1993, despite US opposition,
EAEC became a conclave under APEC to discuss issues of common concem
to East Asian economies (Shi 1997 , 11; Lu 1997a, 104-105). Except for the
open, industrialized and heavily export-oriented economies of Hong Kong
and Singapore, which are unsurprisingly ardent free-trade advocates , the
EAEC would become, for the “ Western" design, a viper in APEC's womb.
As a large and expanding economy, the role of China in APEC is obviously
important in determining the goals and direction of the forum. When China
joined APEC , some Chinese had feared that the developed economies , led by
the US and Japan, might dominate APEC and the developing countries in it.
However, they were soon reassured by the presence of other countries also
concemed about the potential dominance of larger powers. APEC
membership included the ASEAN collective , which like China, remained
highly committed to the norm of upholding sovereignty in the conduct of
international relations , and very cautious in making sure that APEC's
institutional development would not constrain members to a course of action
that they have no wish to pursue. By pointing out, as Chinese President Jiang
Zemin did at the 1994 APEC Leaders' Summit in Bogor, Indonesia , that the

diversity of the political systems , institutions and values precluded the pursuit
ofuniformity as unrealistic (Wang 2003 , 144), China and ASEAN managed to
scuttle US President Clinton's prior proposal at Seattle for “ securitizing"
APEC , or institutionalizing it to any meaningful extent. However, in the
run-up to hosting the Bogor summit , President Suharto of Indonesia was
prevailed upon by the US and Australia , which appealed to his vanity as the
elder statesman of ASEAN , to press the cause for trade liberalization within
APEC , at least to set a timetable to that effect (Ravenhill 2001 , 106-108).
Although Suharto seemed to have lost interest in this cause when his country
was no longer the host of APEC , in any case , the dominant theme at Bogor
would continue from Seattle to be the free trade push championed by the US
and other Westem countries.
One of China's main objectives in APEC is to strengthen its relationship with
ASEAN , and engage ASEAN in joint efforts to promote the interests of
developing countries in the forum (Moore and Yang 1999 , 392). Within APEC ,
China has unfailingly supported ASEAN's 1990 “ Kuching Consensus ," based
on the “ ASEAN Way," which has evolved through decades of interaction
among ASEAN member states and is characterized by decision-making based
on consensus , gradualism , and voluntarism. China shares the belief with
ASEAN and other developing countrjes within APEC that, because the
economic starting point of members are different , their abilities to sustain
market opening efforts are also different, and hence the principle of
non-binding unilateral action after consultation should apply with respect to
effecting trade liberalization measures. China and other developing countries
in APEC were successful in making their case at Bogor for a deadline of2010
for developed countries to carry out free trade and investment within the
forum while developing countries will have up till 2020 to meet these goals.
In hindsight, this albeit non-binding liberalization timetable which found its
place in the 1994 Bogor Declaration would prove to be the high-water mark
in the operationalization of APEC , as few tangible results have been achieved
since then , with the advent of the “ Asian / Chinese / Process-oriented"
(shortened to “ Asian") design for the forum , championed by China, South
Korea, and most countries of ASEAN.
Since its participation , China has used APEC as a vehicle to build support
among member economies for its economic reforms and market opening ,
export pushes into foreign countries , and perhaps most importantly, accession
to first the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) , and later, the
World Trade Organization (WTO). At the 1994 Bogor summit, knowing
Chinese intentions , the US insisted that China join GATT / WTO as a

developed country. Since China is recognized by APEC as a developing
country, defined as a country with an annual per capital income of less than
US$1000 , and so does not have to liberalize trade until 2020 (Moore and
Yang 1999, 396) , China argued successfully that this would be its stance in its
GATT/ 吼TTO talks with the US. China has clearly limited its commitments in
APEC in order to avoid pressure for it to commit more in negotiations over
WTO accession.
Although Malaysia was the only country that explicitly rejected Bogor's
liberalization timetable , ASEAN and China has achieved broad agreement by
the time of that summit on what should be their preferred style or way of
cooperation within APEC, which are to be based on the principles of
voluntary and unilateral action, consensus, “open regionalism" through
non-discriminatory trade and investment liberalization, equal attention to both
liberalization and inter-state economic and technical cooperation, and
retaining APEC as an official forum for discussion and not negotiation (Wang
2003 , 143). By the end of 1994, in response to earlier EPG recommendations,
ASEAN govemments have come to an agreement to negate any notion of
binding investment principles or the adoption of dispute settlement
mechanisms. To quote Feinberg, “member govemments purposefully
eschewed creation of a powerful intemational bureaucracy that might develop
a mind of its own... whose relative autonomy might give it the power and the
will to drive policy." (Feinberg 2001 , 195) In rejecting “ Western" bargaining
methods with specific goals, APEC fell back practically by default on the less
structured and more informal “ Asian" approach characterized by unilateral
and voluntary measures that appear to reflect and withstand better the
sensitive sovereignty concerns , powerful domestic political-e conomic
interests, diverse political beliefs, different levels of economic development,
and occasionally difficult foreign relations of countries, or economies, in the
broad Asia - Pacific region. Considering that ASEAN govemments then
successfully asked for the EPG's mandate to be terminated at the 1995
Leaders' Meeting in Osaka, the decision at Osaka to establish the APEC
Business Advisory Council (ABAC) for the di 旺used business community to
serve as the forum 's peak advisory body to hold industrial dialogues , although
ABAC has a representative who attends Ministerial Meetings , cannot be
considered progress made in the institutionalization of APEC.
Since how liberalized trade should be has become a contentious issue within
the forum , as most developing member economies did not seem to want free
trade to be thrust upon them, Bogor did not determine any final standards for
trade liberalization. That is , it never defined whether tariff should be
9

eliminated entirely or reduced to a low figure of, s呵， 3% or 5%.
Consequently, when leaders to the APEC summit in 1995 in Osaka, Japan ,
met to finalize the Osaka Action Aσenda. where member economies
。，
undertook to “ gradually reduce tariffs and non-tariff measures ," no
quantitative or joint targets were se t. While the US , Australia and other major
agricuhure exporting countries were in favor of trade liberalization in all areas ,
South Korea and Japan in particular argued for the exclusion of agriculture
and other areas that they considered to be politically sensitive from such
consideration (Wei 1996, 54) , given the strength ofthe farmers' lobby in their
electoral processes. 1n this aspect they were supported by China, which had
wanted to minimize external impacts on its economy as much as possible.
Malaysia and Thailand both have domestic automobile and automobile parts
industries that they wished to protect. Osaka also failed to resolve the issue of
“ non-discrimination," whereby any trade or investment privileges given by
one APEC member economy to another will automatically be extended to
non-APEC members , although at least one prominent study has shown that
import, and presumably expo此， among APEC economies and from the rest of
the world would definitely increase more with the elimination of tariff and
non-tariff barriers throughout the world than with just their elimination within
APEC (Chan and Nugent 1999, 527). This failure was primarily due to the
fact that the US was afraid that, if the principle of “ non-discrimination" were
adopted , then Most Favored Nation (MFN) status will have to be
automatically and unconditionally extended to a major economy like China
that was as yet not a member of GATT / WTO; thus after heated debate , the
Osaka Action Agenda managed only to urge APEC member economies to
exert effort to realize the “ non-discrimination" principle (Wei 1996, 54).
Although tariff barriers were by then very low for the US as compared to
other APEC economies , there were still quite a few items from its non-tariff
menu that it could have chosen from to reduce import barriers but did not (Lu
and Zhang 1996, 8) , therefore undermining what the US has always exhorted
other APEC members to do.
The major benefit for China and developing countries in Asia is such
“ tlexibility" 的 arrived at through the artful waftling and compromises by
APEC members at the Osaka meeting. Considering the great diversity in the
stages of economic development and socio-political systems among member
economies , a “ tlexible" approach in settling down to a consensual and
non-binding style of policy cooperation is perhaps necessary to overcome
mutual distrust and initiate and implement actions. Also , since China is a large
developing country with low per capita income , on the difficult road from
reforming a planned economic system into a market-oriented one , it wanted
10

APEC to move gradually, and consensually, which means giving every
member an effective veto over any proposal that, in its opinion, may have an
adverse effect on it if implemented. For the developing countries, the free
trade objective, if pursued too fast and too furiously, risks exposing many of
their manufacturing and service industries to competitive pressures which
they could not withstand (Camilleri 2003 , 143). Japan was determined to keep
tariffs on imported rice , wheat and other cereals at the range of 300% to 500 0/0
(Zhao 1997 , 95) , to protect its politically-intluential agricultural sector, and
began to realize that moving closer to the Asian position on the non-binding,
voluntary, consensual and non-discriminatory nature of APEC's functioning
may garner it the support of Asian countries in detlecting US pressure on
trade liberalization (Wang 2003 , 145). In a move seen as demonstrating quiet
opposition to Washington's free trade banner, Tokyo announced a 10 billion
Yen fund to promote economic and technical cooperation among APEC
members (Lu 1997丸 109) ， after China held the inaugural meeting of APEC
science and technology ministers in October 1995 and chose environmental
protection , computer web-site development and emergency prevention as the
key areas of cooperation (Tang 2003 , 329). Perhaps disappointed with the
“ tlexibility" already demonstrated by APEC member economies at Bogor, US
President Clinton skipped Osaka altogether. Since then , APEC as a dominant
trans-Pacific economic construct has cleariy lost the interest and attention of
its chief advocate , the United States.
Since 1995, the 10 的r goals of trade and investment liberalization have in
reality been replaced by that of business facilitation in focusing on reducing
the costs of business transactions and promoting the exchange of trade
information. When at the 2001 APEC summit in China's Shanghai , the US
tried to revise the Osaka Action Agenda, by introducing proposals such as the
liberalization of tariffs until they reached zero , reduction of all non-tari 叮
measures to the maximum possible extent, and elimination of all such
measures counter to WTO stipulations , it did not manage to have any of these
suggestions included in the final declaration (Lu 2002 , 50) , which re f1 ected
the degree of disagreement among APEC participants. lt might have been
theoretically possible for Western or developed economies to convince Asian
or developing economies to liberalize trade and investment with all deliberate
speed by offering to compensate them at the industry or sector level for any
measurable losses. However, assuming that the types and levels of
reimbursement can be agreed upon by all parties concerned , because of the
high cost that will certainly be involved , no cross-national compensation
schemes have ever been suggested.
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IV.One “ Asi3n / Chinese / Process-oriented" Design (1996-2000)
ASEAN and Chinese officials have always insisted that economic and
technical cooperation should receive at least equal priority with trade and
investment liberalization on APEC's agenda (Moore and Yang 1999, 388). As
of the 1993 Seattle summit, issues of economic and technical cooperation
have never been separately raised at APEC meetings. However, on this, the
flavor of the forum seemed to have changed following the 1995 Osaka
summit. While ministerial meetings were held hitherto only on the portfolios
of trade , finance , small and medium enterprises , education , and sustainable
development of the environment, since 1995, they were subsequently
introduced in the sectors of energy, health , human resource , mining, oceanic
research , science and technology cooperation, telecommunications and
information , transportation , women 's affairs and tourism. During the leaders'
meeting at Manila in 1996, both the Chinese President and Foreign Minister
came out strongly in favor of strengthening economic and technical
cooperation within APEC. At the close of the meeting, under the aegis of host
Philippines, an ‘ APEC Framework Declaration on the Principles of Economic
and Technical Cooperation' was adopted, which reflected the importance
attached to economic and technical cooperation by developing members of
APEC , more so than to trade and financial liberalization , which was the
preference of the forum 's more industrialized members.
The Manila Action Plan, arrived at through the 1996 APEC Manila ministerial
meeting, outlined 6 areas for economic and technical cooperation: developing
human capital, fostering sound and efficient capital markets , strengthening
economic infrastructure , harnessing technologies of the future , promoting
environmentally-sustainable growth , and encouraging the growth of small and
medium-sized enterprises (Feinberg 2001 , 202). Thus “ Ecotech" aims to
develop human capital through technical training, build state or institutional
capacity as a foundation for economic growth , and reduce economic
disparities amongst APEC member economies. 1n 2006, of a total of 121
Ecotech - related projects , 32% were focused on developing human capital ,
while 28% were focused on strengthening economic infrastructure
(http://www.apec.org/content/apec/apec_groups/committees/som_ committee_
on_economic.html).2 The US feared that developing countries intended to
transform APEC into a conduit for North-South transfers , so since Manila, it
has been watchful for any signs that “ Ecotech" may morph into demands for
development assistance. Developing countries , on the other h ;md , see

,

This and subsequent internet footnotes refer to the official website of the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation

2
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“ Ecotech" as a foundation for promoting national economic development and
poverty reduction , which would in tum serve as a basis for accepting trade
and investment liberalization in the indefinite future.
At the 1996 Manila ministerial meeting, the US had wanted the APEC
membership to push for an information technology (IT) agreement at the
WTO that would have abolished all tariffs for integrated circuits ,
semi-conductors , computer so 丘ware and other IT products by 2000 (Lu
1997b, 22). This suggestion made sense for the US , considering that is the
biggest seller of IT products in the world , even then exporting almost US$1 00
billion worth of such merchandise , dominating around 80% of the market in
the Pacific Rim countries (Lu 1997b, 25). ln this , the US was supported by
Japan , Canada, Australia and other developed countries , but China, Malaysia,
lndonesia, Chile and other developing countries were against (Lu 1997b, 22).
As a compromise retlective of the now dominant “ Asian" approach in APEC ,
member economies rhetorically supported “ major" reductions in tariffs for IT
products by 2000 , to be arrived “ tlexibly" at WTO negotiations in Geneva,
Switzerland , (Lu 1997b, 25) by moving the issue out of APEC.
As suggested at the Osaka summit and written into the Manila Action Plan ,
APEC's main vehicle for advancing toward the Bogor goal of “ free and open
trade and investment" is the lndividual Action Plans (IAPs) submitted by
member economies on a rolling basis. The reporting of IAPs are based on
activities to meet the go~ls of free and open trade and investment in such
issues areas like tariffs , non-tariff measures , investment , services , customs
procedures , standards , inte Il ectual property, competition policy, government
procurement, deregulation , rules of origin , and dispute mediation
G句://www.apec.orglcontentJ ape c./about_apeclhow_apec_operates/actionylans_.html).
Under this plan , China promised to lower import tariffs by 2000 to 15%
(Zhang and Lu 1997 , 166) , which was ultimately realized. ln addition ,
Collective Action Plans (CAPs) assist economic integration through the
provision of databases , promotion of transparency, studies of best practices
and policy initiatives , and business facilitation (Feinberg 2001 , 202). Neither
commitments to the targets outlined in the IAPs nor CAPs are binding. Even
though APEC has instituted peer review of member economies' IAPs by the
officials , experts and ABAC of other APEC members (Zhong 2003 , 56) , and
established an electronic IAP (e-IAP) system at the 2000 Brunei summit to
provide IAPs online for public inspection , yet under the principle of
voluntarism, countries approach the Bogor targets at their own pace, which
cannot guarantee faithful and effective enforcement. Furthermore , whatever
little efforts that had already been made within APEC to advance within its
J3

1994 Bogor summit goal of creating a free trade and investment zone by the
2010 and 2020 deadlines were effectively derailed by the 1997 / 1998 East
Asian tìnancial crisis (Dent 2003 , 78), which exposed APEC's inability to
deal with the situation.
In response to the previous summit in Osaka, in which the US Secretary of
Defense William Perry attempted to engage participants in the discussion of
security matters , the President of the Philippines and host of the 1996 Manila
summit, Fidel Ramos , announced clearly at the beginning that the agenda of
the summit would not include security issues (Wei 1996, 53). Ramos was
clearly articulating the preferences of the Asian members of the forum.
Despite widespread expectations , criteria for membership could not be agreed
upon at the 1997 summit in Vancouver, Canada, so a ten year moratorium on
new membership was then instituted, although Vi etnam , Peru and Russia as
Pacitìc Rim countries were allowed to join APEC the following year on an
extemporized basis. Conceming APEC's concerted Early Voluntary Sectoral
Liberalization (EVSL) scheme , even when it was introduced at the Vancouver
summit, it was clear that Japan, which by then was tìrmly in the economic
doldrums , would not liberalize any sector, particularly agriculture , forestry
and tìsheries , to trade , which its govemment had deemed politically difficult
to ca叮y out , despite intense pressure from the US (Damond 2003 , 96; Dent
2003 , 78). Since the failure ofEVSL negotiations in 1998 , torpedoed by Japan ,
with support from other Asian countries , over the need to protect narrow
domestic interests , US efforts to push for more rapid trade liberalization
within APEC have been largely stymied. Since the 1998 summit in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, when China joined Japan in arguing that product
exemptions from tariff cuts in specitìc sectors were too stringent (Damond
2003 , 99) , and the 1999 summit in Auckland , New Zealand, whatever remains
of liberalization efforts within APEC was left to individual member
economies to put in place on a sectoral basis unilaterally (Zhou 2001 , 70).
The principal task of APEC has by then moved on to the promotion of the
WTO process , in whatever small ways it could. In any case , in all three
summits in 1997, 1998 and 1999, APEC lost considerable credibility when it
proved unable to come up with any concrete measures to assist Asian member
economies ravaged by the tìnancial crisis then raging through the region.
With the Asian tìnancial crisis in 1997-1999, US pressure on a叮ected
countries to adopt liberal economic reforms were dramatically increased , with
loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to
South Korea, Thailand , and Indonesia made conditional on establishing new
14

regulatory, bankruptcy and accounting procedures , liberalization of capital
markets , privatization of public enterprises and the breaking up of cartels
(Wee 2002 , 91). The IMF's recommended austerity measures such as raising
interest rates and creating budget su中 luses actually deepened recession ,
unemployment , and political instability, particularly in Indonesia, but also for
Thailand (Lim 2004 , 351). For -more than a year after seeking financial
assistance from the I扎1F， the exchange rates on the Korean , Thai and
Indonesian currencies actually deteriorated , in contrast to Malaysia, which
had managed to reverse the fall in private capital inflow in 1998 by imposing
capital controls without IMF help (Lim 2004 , 344-6). The overall approach
taken by the US through the IMF and World 8ank reflected their collective
perspective that Japan's economic problems and the Asian crisis flow from
the inefficiencies and distortions of the various state-centered approaches to
capitalist development which prevail in East Asia (Berger 1998 , 98). The
Asian financial crisis did afford a chance for the deepening of economic
liberalism in East Asia, particularly in the countries that suffered the most, but
it also led to crisis of faith in intemational economic institutions led by the US ,
and the unpopularity of the American position within APEC with regional
countries.
To many in the Chinese officialdom, APEC remains one aspect of US strategy
to enhance its national economic competitiveness through breaking down the
trade and financial entry barriers of member economies to its penetration. As
such, an APEC initiative such as the “ Eminent Persons Group" headed by the
American economist C. Fred Bergsten, a fervent free trade advocate , was
viewed by the Chinese with particular suspicion, somewhat as a busybody
attempting to pry into the affairs of individual member economies and tell
them what to do. Hence when ASEAN suggested abolishing the EP G, this
stance was supported by China to curb what it perceived to be US influence
and free trade crusading in APEC.
Up till the time of its joining the WTO , Beijing has sought to use APEC as a
shield to resist external pressure for the rapid dismantling of trade barriers ,
even as Chinese leaders proclaimed their continuing adherence to the 2010
and 2020 trade liberalization and facilitation goals (Morrison 2002 , 129), and
was altogether opposed to adding capital market liberalization to the APEC
agenda, by arguing that financial liberalization was none of APEC's business
(Moore and Yang 1999 , 400-402). Still , to accommodate itselfto the rules and
regulations of intemational commerce, realize its promises to APEC, and
increase the speed of domestic economic reforms, the Chinese government
has, among other measures, pushed to establish a modem industrial
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management system , set up stock markets and security exchanges , cleanup its
financial and banking institutions , reform its state-owned enterprises ,
strengthen its policing and enforcement mechanism to ensure the smooth
functioning of laws and markets , attack local protectionist barriers and
corruption to ensure fair competition in the marketplace , simplify customs
and investment procedures , and harmonize its commercial laws and
regulations in accordance with intemational standards (Wang 2003 , 161). In
support of “ Ecotech ," the Chinese government set up a US$10 million
endowment fund specifically to promote scientific and technological
production in developing APEC economies (Liang and Wang 2000 , 58).
The Americans have since been persuaded by other Asia - Pacific countries to
be less confrontational toward China and more accommodating toward a
much slower pace of realizing regional and global free trade than what the US
would prefer, in line with the APEC style of conducting business along the
“ ASEAN Way". For Japan , putting the breaks on any concerted APEC push
for trade liberalization has the advantage of aligning it more c1 0sely with
Chinese and ASEAN interests and perceptions (Ravenhill 2001 , 99-103).
Over the years , all players have agreed , reluctantly or otherwise , that APEC
would essentially be a non-formal or minimally institutionalized forum for
consu 1tations and discussions among high-level representatives of member
economies on matters of common interest and concem, particularly in the
economic realm. Hence it is not surprising that leaders' meetings are
customarily prefixed with the term “ informal ," and all rules and principles
adopted by APEC are labeled as “ non-binding." (Zhang 2000 , 32) 可Tith its
emphasis on voluntary action , political commitment, open regionalism and
broad economic cooperation , as opposed to negotiated agreement, legal
obligation , specific reciprocity and sharply focused agenda, APEC has
developed a distinct Asian f1 avor much more akin to that of ASEAN than to
regional institutions in Europe or the Americas (Morrison 2002 , 131).
V. One (“ economic") and a Half (“ securityηDesign (Since 2001)
China and the ASEAN collectivity have always emphasized that regional
cooperation , in both economic and security spheres , must take into account
the principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic
affairs of states. Such a stance , taken with the heterogeneity of po 1itical
systems , sovereignty claims , border disputes , secessionist actions , security
tensions and mutual suspicions among members in mind , has caused APEC
meetings to exclude security and political issues from their agenda. Hbwever,
since the APEC summit of 2001 , it was generally agreed that such issues
16

could be discussed, but only if they pertain directly to the economic security
of member economies.
Meeting in China's Shanghai just one month after the 9-11 attacks , APEC
leaders at their 2001 summit promised to cooperate with the US to counter all
forms of terrorism , acknowledging that terrorist activities will endanger the
security and prosperity of the whole world. The harmful effects of terrorism
on tourism were threatening a significant source of many member countries'
economic developmen t. In line with APEC's economic orientation, the
resultant ‘ APEC Leaders' Statement on Counter-Terrorism' directed members'
finance and transportation ministries to , respectively, freeze the funds of
terrorist organizations and improve air and maritime security. This Statement
was the first political-cum-security declaration by APEC since its formation.
Under an arrangement made by China as the host of the summit, no
representatives from Taiwan (Chinese Taipei) or Hong Kong were allowed to
attend the discussions pertaining to terrorism , since they were regarded by the
Chinese as only non-sovereign economies and not states (Lu, 2004).
Hosting the 2001 APEC Informal Leaders' Summit in Shanghai has been seen
by the Chinese as an important measure in the heralding of China as a major
responsible power in the international stage. While China's average tariff in
1993 was still 37.5%, by 2001 this was reduced to 15.3%, and by 2002 the
figure has reached 12% (Wang 2003 ，的 0-151). Not to be upstaged by
American concems about matters of anti-terrorism and security, the Chinese
government made a commitment to APEC member economies to instruct
1500 high-level specialists in computer website maintenance at its expense
for the following three years and to contribute US$2 million to train personnel
in the areas of finance (Zhao 2001 , 9).
Following the terrorist bombing in Bali in October 2002 , at the APEC leaders'
meeting at Los Lobos, Mexico, the US led a drive to cooperate in notifying
customs and immigration of suspicions travelers by member governments and
increase security in monitoring shipping containers. Measures such as
requiring biometric technology on exit and entry documents, standardized
passenger and baggage screening and additional customs security to screen
high risk ships and containers were all part of the US proposal (Aggarwal and
Kwei 2006, 78).
US a前empts to "re-securitize" APEC after its failures to do so by the
mid-1990s were only a little more successful this time. At the 2003 APEC
meeting in Bangkok, the US tried to put forward several security initiatives
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regarding anti-nu c1 ear proliferation in general and specific nuclear issues with
North Korea and Iran into the APEC agenda, but this was opposed by many
members as an unnecessary widening of the forum's ambit (Lu , 2004).
Nonetheless , the US managed to persuade fellow APEC members to set up a
Counter-Terrorism Task Force to study the issue of terrorist threats at that
meeting. APEC's 2004 summit meetings in Santiago , Chile , and the 2005
meeting in Busan, South Korea, have continued to provide occasions for
world leaders to confer on major issues such as North Korea's nu c1 ear
intentions and emphasize the need to pursue counterterrorism measures. The
2006 APEC meeting in Hanoi , Vietnam , further pledged to improve aviation
security and encourage member economies to develop and share strategies
and best practices to defend food supply from deliberate contamination.
Although food security was again seriously discussed , it was environmental
issues that for the first time took center stage at the 2007 APEC meeting in
Sydney, Australia, when the host country, together with the US , brokered a
draft for forum leaders to adopt that would reduce energy intensity 25 percent
and increase forest cover in APEC member economies by at least 50 million
acres by 2030; however, true to APEC practices , the draft also stipulated that
both goals are non-binding. (http://www.cnn.com/2007IPOLITICS/09/08/
apec.ap/index.html?ire f= newssearch) Although APEC was not set up as a
confidence-building mechanism , the annual summitry does provide for the
leaders of member economies both a “ photo opportunity" and an effective
channel to meet and exchange views on one another 's position on important
affairs affecting the world.
Although counter-terrorism and de-nu c1 earization of North Korea have
remained on the de c1 arations after every APEC summit since 2002 , and the
US , China, and the other member economies have exto l1 ed one another to
work together to deal with issues of shared concern , there is no sign that the
institutionalization of the forum has somehow progressed beyond allowing it
to remain principally a discussion group , albeit a high-level one , for economic
and related security interests. This is because there are few common and
concrete purposes for members to work on. Particularly in terms of security
concems , even though it is in the national interest of APEC members to guard
against acts of terrorism in general , they do not have a universal enemy,
terrorist or otherwise , that threatens them all in the same way or to the same
degree. Furthermore , members are by and large suspicious that others may try
to make use of the forum to push their own interests and agenda , and so tend
to take a long time to study a proposal from all different possible angles.
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For a multilateral forum the size of APEC , with many meetings , seminars ,
workshops , projects , reports and organs , it is not particular1 y well-endowed
financially, with an annual operating budget of less than US$4 million. This is
in accord with the structural minimization approach for APEC favored by its
developing country members. Since 1997 , putting money where its mouth is
largely not, Japan has provided more than US$4 million per year into a
special account to promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation
(T1LF). 1n 2005, members approved the establishment of the APEC Support
Fund (ASF) to provide assistance to capacity programs for developing
economies , with an initial donation of A$1 million from Australia,
(http://www.apec.org/content/apec/apec_groups/committees/budget_and_man
agemen t. html) a country that has hitherto fully backed the liberalization aims
of the forum , but seemed to have come round to the “ Asian" way of thinking.
1n 2007 , the US announced that it would contribute US$800 ,000 to the ASF,
and US$1.5 million into the T1LF account , which makes plain where its
priorities still are. (http://www.apec.org/content/apec/news_ medialmedial
releases/030807月一uscontribapecproj.html) As for 俐的ts funded by AP眩，
although the SOM increased the value of projects which the BMC may
approve under delegated authority from the SOM from US$20 ,000 to
US$100 ,000 , most of them are allocated less than US$300 ,000 (Feinberg and
Lawrence 2006 , 2-3). Yet even with financing a small survey, conference, or
database construction, any APEC member economy can veto it through an
action of indefinite delay by one of its representatives in the BMC , senior
officials or ministers as it moves up the endorsement process (Feinberg 2003 ,
74 , 77).
To enable some APEC member economies that are willing and ready to move
faster on specific areas or initiatives to do so , APEC uses an approach that it
calls “ Pathfinder 1nitiatives." (http://www.apec.org/contentlapec/apec_groups/
committees/economic_on_trade.html) Yet , for all of the forum's
institutionalization efforts, since APEC commitments are not legal but rather
political in adhering to the by now paramount “ Asian+" design , there can be
no sanctions to punish laggards or defectors. In any case , decisions made at
the APEC summits and ministerial meetings , if there any, are non-binding,
and left to individual members to execute. Peer pressure from fellow
economies to get an APEC agenda adopted and executed works only to the
extent that it is in the interest of a member to accept that pressure. The
voluntary nature of the APEC decision-making process had succumbed
completely to a least common denominator approach in reaching consensus , if
any consensus can be reached at all , in which the goal of maintaining a
tranquil atmosphere at APEC meetings is overriding (Damond 2003 , 102). As
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members gain more trust in one another, they may be prepared to pool some
sovereignty, if not with regards to security matters , at least in some less
sensitive areas. Alas , that moment has clearly not yet arrived, and most APEC
activities still remain at the stage of promoting dialogue , exchanging
information , and publishing reports.
VI. Who Needs APEC?
In a clever presentation of the unavoidable as virtue , the official APEC
web-site refers to APEC as being unique , in that it is the only mu1tilateral
economic and trade forum in the world that is committed to reducing trade
barriers and increasing investments without requiring its members to enter
into legally binding obligations. (http://www.apec.org/contentlapec/
about_apec/how_ apec_ operates.html) There has been no shortage of meetings
or reports dealing with trade , investment, development or general economics
issues of any and all types within the APEC system , except that they typically
lead to extremely few concrete resu 1ts that all parties could agree on to
implement and evaluate together. By putting out serious proposals for free
trade and investment in full expectation of its non-execution , APEC seems to
have settled on an uneasy, and perhaps institutionalized , game of compromise
between the preferences of the go-getting Westerners and the foot-dragging
Asians.
The crux of the contention in designing altemative visions for APEC f!1 ay be
seen as a reflection of opposing interests on liberalization and
institutionalization within the forum between the US , its allies , developed or
industrialized countries and newly-industrialized economies on the one hand ,
and China and developing or industrializing countries on the other hand , with
Japan moving from the “ Westem" “ camp" to the “ Asian" one some time
between 1994 and 1995. Fundamentally, while adherents of the “ Western"
design would like to promote and perpetuate the advantages that they enjoy or
would do so with trade and investment liberalization, advocates of the
“ Asian" vision , despite suffering through the adverse impact that the Asian
financial crisis had in varying degrees on their economies , still believe to
some extent in preserving the business-political nexus and industrial policies
that have brought a respectable measure of political stability, material
prosperity and diplomatic influence to countries like Japan , South Korea,
Taiwan and Singapore. These two roadmaps reflect differences of interest and
are not easily reconcilable.
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The 1993 inaugural APEC Leaders' Summit at Seattle was significant to the
extent that the profile of the forum was henceforth heightened. By 1995 , the
institutional or organizational structure of APEC that exists today has been
put in place, but it was also at the Osaka Summit that the last major joint
effort to push for comprehensive trade and investment liberalization clearly
failed , and where members decided that an autonomous structure for the
forum was not in the offing by abolishing the EP G. By the end of 1997,
technical and developmental issues have clearly dominated forum
deliberations , and the APEC sub-caucus of EAEC had become formalized as
a self-standing ASEAN+ 3 , grouping leaders of ASEAN , Japan, China and
South Korea together in annual conclaves that are independent of the forum.
As Asian economies have fully recovered to strong economic growth from the
devastating financial crisis of last century's end and the debilitating Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 , the “ Asian" design for APEC
is likely to continue dominating the forum 's enterprise at the expense of the
“ Western" one. Although India had expressed its desire to join APEC , the
forum decided at its 2007 summit that India's case will not be discussed
before 2010. There were speculations that some westem economies in APEC
had delayed India 's application because of worries that, as a large Asian
economy, its joining would increase Asia's weight in APEC (Malaysian Sun ,
9 September 2007 , A 1), and move the forum- even further away from the
“ Westem" design.
Given its important economic and security roles in the Asia - Pacific region,
the US has preferred , and still prefers , to deal with regional polities on a
bilateral basis. Having secured an FTA with Singapore by the end of 2002 , the
US voiced interest in exploring similar deals with Malaysia, the Philippines
and Thailand (Dent 2003 , 80). In November 2002 , President George W. Bush
announced the ‘ Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative' (EAI) that is designed to
eventually create a regional network linking bilateral FTAs between
individual ASEAN states and the US (Dent 2003 , 130). Along with the
spirited pursuit of bilateral FTAs , emphasis on the completion of the 乳TTO's
Doha Round retlects Washington 's ambivalence about the continuing
prospects of a regional economic forum that is seemingly ineffective, at least
from the point of view of securing definite commitments from East Asian
govemments to liberalize US imports into regional economies. Even on
crucial matters such as the reduction of the more than US$200 billion trade
deficit with China , accompanied by charges of dumping , high tariffs ,
inconsistent application of laws and regulations , and intellectual property
rights violation , the US has not sought to use APEC to any extent as an arena
to exert pressure on Beij ing , preferring instead to do so at bilateral meetings
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with Chinese govemment officials. Indeed , the forum seemed to have merited
so little attention from the US that , at the 2007 APEC summit in Sydney,
President George 乳人 Bush referred in a public speech to APEC as “ OPEC"
and his Australian hosts as “ Austrians" (The Times , 8 September 2007 , A2).
Although an APEC led by the US would not have been welcomed by every
member economy, an absentee or absent-minded role on its part would put the
continuing effectiveness of the forum into very serious doubts.
During the WTO standstill after its tumultuous 1999 meeting in Seattle , and
coming out of more than a decade of sluggish growth , industrial closures , lost
jobs , contraction in bank lending and frequent loan recalls (MacI ntyre and
Naughton 2005 , 85-86) , Japan concluded FTAs with Singapore and Mexico to
spur its economy. Hedging against the success of the Doha Round and the
efficacy of APEC , Singapore completed similar agreements with Australia,
New Zealand , the US , and the European Free Trade Association countries
(Aggarwal and Kwei 2006 , 83).
APEC has been a vast intemational stage for China, and for more than ten
years since its joining, China has borrowed the use of this stage to improve
and develop its diplomatic profile and economic relations with countries in
the Asia - Pacific that are important to it. However, at the same time that the
US is widely viewed as backing down from the multilateral approach and ,
together with Japan, is seen as engaging in more protectionist economic
policies , China is increasingly stressing a more pro-active foreign policy and
liberal economic agenda, in endorsing multilateral structures , supporting freer
trade , involving itself in trans-national issues , and sponsoring security
arrangements (Chow 2006 , 261).
APEC is now far from being the only regional forum in which China is a
member. Since joining the WTO in December 2001 , China has carried out
separate negotiations on bilateral FTA with a dozen countries including
Australia, New Zealand , South Africa and Chile (Lu 2004 , 10). China has no
further need of APEC as a testing ground for domestic political acceptability
of market openness or economic integration , nor has the US or the world any
more use for APEC as the primary mechanism to “ socialize" China to
capitalist or peaceful norms , as was arguably the case in the first half of the
1990s.
Nonetheless , taking part in the activities of APEC has the important
consequence of raising the confidence and reducing the suspicion of the
Chinese leadership and foreign policy community in interacting with foreign
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officials and diplomats , to the extent that China has become keen to promote
regional institutions where the US and its allies are excluded , such as the
Shanghai Cooperative Organization , ASEAN + 3 and ASEAN + China, under
the rubric of which ASEAN states and China signed the Framework
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation in 2002 to begin
negotiations to realize an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area between China and
all ASEAN states by 2015. China's participation in APEC can be expected to
continue at some perfunctory level , but the flow of real diplomatic energy
would swing toward the realm of bilateral relations and multilateral
organizations where China feels not only more comfortable , but also more
economically powerful.
The “ concerted unilateral liberalization" touted in APEC's IAP scheme have
been displaced by “ concerted bilateral liberalization," in the sense that trade
bilateralism seems to have now totally marginalized APEC's endeavors at
advancing trade liberalization in the Asia - Pacific (Dent 2003 , 79). Bilateral
trade agreements have emerged as the preferred mechanism for APEC
member economies to realize reciprocal market access , consequently making
APEC itself virtually redundant as a forum to advance overall freer trade.
APEC's fifteen-year “ Mid-term Stock-take" at the 2005 Busan summit, which
was supposed to generate a second wind for APEC, came and went with nary
a squeak. Yet, despite its many limitations and unfulfilled promises as a
multilateral decision-making process for trade and investment policy issues ,
APEC has brought together the leaders of most economies of any size on both
sides of the Pacific Ocean to discuss trade , investment , and of late , economic
security and even environmental concems , provided the US with a platform to
demonstrate to the world a greater degree of economic multilateralism than
before , and more so , proven to be a useful vehicle in “ socializing" China into
becoming a more accepted and commitled member of the international system.
We may be asking too much of it in asking for more.
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